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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff/Appellant, Robert Groves' (hereafter 
"Groves") Appeal from the district court's Judgment of Dismissal (and underlying Memorandum 
Decision re: constitutionality of 2009 amendment to IDAHO CODE § 18-8303(1 », filed June 22, 
2013. R. Vol. I,pp.IOO-II8. 
On January 17,2013, Groves signed an affidavitunder oath stating that he was qualified 
to be relieved from the sex offender registration requirement. R. Vol. 1, pp. 6-7. He filed a 
petition to be released from sex offender registration requirements on February 8, 2013. R. Vol. 
1, pp. 4-5. 
On February 11,2013, the district court issued an Order denying his petition, based upon 
IDAHO CODE § 18-8303(1). R. Vol. 1, pp. 11-28. The district court allowed Groves to seek 
reconsideration of the district court's decision at that time. R. Vol. 1, p. 12. 
On February 26,2013, Groves signed another affidavit under oath in support of an 
amended petition to be released from the registration requirement. R. Vol. 1, pp. 31-32. This 
time Groves included a paragraph alleging at the time he entered a guilty plea, he had been told 
that he would only have to register Eas a sex offender) for a period often (10) years.l Jd. at 32. 
Groves also filed his initial response to the district court's order alleging for the first time, on 
reconsideration~ that the 2009 Amendment was in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the 
United States Constitution. R. Vol. 1, pp. 34-40. 
The district court then set a hearing on the issue of the constitutionality of the amendment 
I He does not give any names of who told him this, nor does the criminal judgment conviction contain any indication 
that his plea was entered upon his consideration of this fact. 
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to IDAHO CODE § 18-8303(1) for May 6,2013. R. Vol. 1, p. 42? On May 6, 2013, the district 
court held a hearing by phone. On May 6, 2013, Groves submitted the Petitioner's Legislative 
History of IDAHO CODE § 18-8303, to the court and to the Prosecutor's Office; but he failed to 
serve the same on the Sex Offender Registry ("SOR"). R. Vol. 1, pp. 53-60. During the hearing, 
the court asked the parties for further briefing on the issue of the constitutionality of the 
amendment to IDAHO CODE § 18-8303(1). R. Vol. 1, pp. 61-62. 
The parties submitted their briefs as requested. R. Vol. 1, pp. 63-99. The district court 
then ruled on the matter as set forth above. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review." Smith v. Washington County Idaho, 150 Idaho 388, 247 P.3d 615, 617 (2010), citing 
Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am., 148 Idaho 427, 430, 224 P.3d 494, 497 (2009). "When [this] Court 
must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent, and give 
effect to that intent." State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho 849, 275 P.3d 864,866 (2012), citing State v. 
Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462,988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). 
Whether a law is civil or criminal is a matter of statutory construction. State v. Johnson, 
152 Idaho 41, 266 P.3d 1146 (2011) citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84,92, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (2003). 
"Where a legislative restriction 'is an incident of the State's power to protect the health and 
safety of its citizens,' it will be considered' as evidencing an intent to exercise that regulatory 
power, and not a purpose to add to the punishment.'" Smith, 538 U.S. at 93-94,123 S.Ct at 1147. 
2 During the interim, the SOR appeared through counsel to notifY the court of Groves' ineligibility due to the sex 
offense he was convicted of, to wit: IDAHO CODE § 18-1508. 
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Moreover, when reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, the Court exercises free 
review. Idaho Schs. For Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State (ISEEO IV), 140 Idaho 586, 590, 97 
P.3d 453 (2004). To prevail, a challenger must show that the statute is "unconstitutional as a 
whole, without any valid application." Id. The Court should make "every presumption [ ] in 
favor of the constitutionality of the statute, and the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality 
of a statutory provision rests upon the challenger." Id. The party challenging a statute bears the 
burden of proving it unconstitutional. Id. 
To succeed on a facial challenge, one must demonstrate that under no circumstance is the 
statute valid. State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 69 P.3d 126, 132 (2003). To prove a statute is 
unconstitutional "as applied," the party challenging the constitutionality of the statute must 
demonstrate that the statute, as applied to the defendant's conduct, is unconstitutional. 
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The SOR does not take exception to how Groves' formulates the first issue on appeal. 
However, Groves either misstates or is incorrect in his assumption as to the second issue on 
appeal. As in this case, because the district court reached the correct conclusion that IDAHO 
CODE § 18-8303(1) was constitutionally sound, by law Groves was disqualified from petitioning 
for release from the sex offender registration requirement. Therefore, an evidentiary hearing 
would have been improper. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
Groves' acknowledges that the Idaho legislature "has attempted to enact a regulatory 
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scheme that is civil and non-punitive.,,3 He argues nevertheless that at the time he was 
sentenced and as the sex offender registration law was written at that time, "he could expect to 
petition for release from registration after a period of ten (10) years. However, subsequent to his 
plea and sentencing, the Legislature amended IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8310 and 18-8303 at least 
twice to create a situation that basically eliminated Petitioner's chance to petition for release 
from the registration requirements.,,4 The amendments that led to the current IDAHO CODE § 18-
8303 and IDAHO CODE § 18-8310 now categorizes IDAHO CODE § 18-1508 as an aggravated 
offense that precludes release from sex offender registration. Groves argues that the 
amendments to IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8303 and 18-8310 are punitive and therefore unconstitutional 
both on their face and as applied to him, and as such, offend the Ex Post facto Clause and are 
therefore unconstitutional. 5 
Groves maintains that his "primary focus, and allegation of unconstitutionality, rely 
primarily upon the fact that the State of Idaho has taken away rights from him that he previously 
had the benefit of. ,,6 (emphasis in Appellant's Brief). 
However, this Court is well versed in the amendments to IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8303 and 
18-8310 as well as the series of Idaho appellate court cases that have addressed issues involving 
alleged rights of due process and ex post facto challenges to Idaho's sex offender registration 
laws: See, Ray v. State, 13 3 Idaho 96, 100-101, (1999) (holding sex offender registration is not a 
direct consequence of a guilty plea. The purpose ofIdaho's registration statute is not punitive, 
3 See, Appellant's Brief, p. 12 ~ 3. 
4 1d , pp. 1,5,6 and 19. 
5 Id at 11, 19 and 20. 
6 Id, pp. 5, 6,10 and 23. 
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but remedial.); State v. Gragg, 143 Idaho 74, 137 P.3d 461 (Ct.App. 2005) (holding Sexual 
Offender Registration and Notification and Community-Right-to-Know Act did not constitute ex 
post facto law; legislature intended the Act as a civil scheme, rather than criminal scheme, and 
the effects of the Act, which included public access to certain registry information and posting of 
that information on the internet, were not so punitive as to override the legislative intent.); Smith 
v. State, 146 Idaho 822,203 P.3d 1221 (2009) (concluding the duty to register as a sex offender 
is triggered simply by reason of conviction for a specified crime, but classification as a violent 
sexual predator C'VSP") is based upon a factual determination of probable future conduct, i.e., 
that the offender poses a high risk of committing an offense or engaging in predatory sexual 
conduct.) State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41 (2011), determining inter alia, where a legislative 
restriction is an incident of the state's power to protect the health and safety of its citizens, it will 
be considered as evidencing an intent to exercise that regulatory power, and not a purpose to add 
to the punishment; and Bottum v. Idaho State Police, Bureau of Criminal Identification, 154 
Idaho 182,296 P.3d 388 (2013) (concluding ... the 2009 amendment is expressly declared to be 
retroactive, we need not address whether applying the amendment to Mr. Bottum would, as he 
contends, attach a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past). 
It is worth noting that the Idaho Supreme Court found that "The Court of Appeals 
opinion in Gragg is thoughtful and its holding is correct." State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41, 45, 
266 P.3d 1146, 1150 (2011). Gragg, relied heavily on the United States Supreme Court decision 
in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (2003). 
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Seeing no cogent reason why the Idaho Supreme Court would depart from its' line of 
reasoning in these cases, including reliance on Smith v. Doe, and considering application of the 
doctrine of stare decisis, the SOR will rely upon the same. 
a. SORA is retroactive. 
The Idaho appellate courts have consistently held that the Sexual Offender Registration 
Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act (SORA), codified as IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8301 
through 18-8326, applies retroactively to persons who had been convicted of specified crimes 
before the statute was enacted. See, Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 982 P.2d 931 (1999); State v. 
Gragg, 143 Idaho 74,137 P.3d 461 (Ct.App. 2005); State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41,266 P.3d 
1146 (2011); Bottum v. Idaho State Police, Bureau of Criminal Identification, 154 Idaho 182, 
296 PJd 388,389-390 (2013) (SORA is expressly retroactive, therefore does not violate IDAHO 
CODE § 73-101). 
Groves does not dispute that the holding of Smith v. Doe has been reversed or overruled. 
b. SORA is not punitive. 
In Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (2003), the United States Supreme Court 
considered for the first time a claim that a sex offender registration and notification law 
constitutes retroactive punishment forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States 
Constitution. The Court acknowledged that the framework for this inquiry is well established: 
We must "ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish 'civil' 
proceedings." Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 
L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment, 
that ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme 
that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the statutory 
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scheme is " 'so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] 
intention' to deem it 'civil.' " Ibid. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 
248-249, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980)). Because we "ordinarily defer 
to the legislature's stated intent," Hendricks, supra, at 361,117 S.Ct. 2072," 'only 
the clearest proof' will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what 
has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty," Hudson v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 93,100, 118 S.Ct. 488,139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (quoting Ward, 
supra, at 249, 100 S.Ct. 2636); see also Hendricks, supra, at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072; 
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 
(1996); United States v. One Assortment oj 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365, 104 
S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984). 
Smith, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. at 1146-1147. 
In State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41, 266 P .3d 1146 (2011), the Idaho Supreme Court stated 
with approval, the Legislature's classification of Johnson's offense as an "aggravated offense," 
subsequent to his guilty plea, was an exception to the general understanding that SORA is 
nonpunitive. As Groves notes properly, the Idaho Supreme Court did not directly hold; whether 
SORA violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, i.e.; whether despite the legislature's stated intent was 
remedial in nature; or whether the effects of SORA were so clearly punitive that they overrode 
the Legislature's stated purpose. Johnson, 152 Idaho at 45,266 P.3d at 1150. 
Johnson did, however, unequivocally describe how the Idaho Supreme Court viewed the 
exact question raised by Groves in the present case. The Court in Johnson, based its view by 
basing its stamp of approval upon the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Smith v. Doe 
and the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in State v. Gragg, 143 Idaho 74, 137 P.3d 461 (Ct.App. 
2005). The Idaho Court of Appeals in Gragg, aligned its determination with the U.S. Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Smith v. Doe. The Smith Court made its ex post Jacto analysis of Alaska's 
sex offender registration law upon the seven factor "intent-effects" test from Kennedy v. 
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Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169,83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963). 
Groves further advances assertions under the Kennedy-Mendoza seven factors test. 
Appellant's Brief at 14-16. In support of his claim he cites to an Alaska Supreme Court's 
decision in Smith v. Doe, 189 P.3d 999 (2008). Id. The Alaska Supreme Court based its 
decision, not on the U. S. Constitution or the Idaho Constitution, but rather on Alaska's 
Constitution. Even then, the Alaska Supreme Court acknowledged that the federal courts had 
found no ex post Jacto violation under the United States Constitution. Smith, 189 P.3d at 1002. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in recognizing the uniqueness ofIdaho's Constitution, held 
"Article I, § 16 of the Idaho Constitution provides, in relevant part: 'No ... ex post facto law ... 
shall ever be passed.' Similarly, Article I, § 10, cl. 1, of the United States Constitution prohibits a 
state from passing an 'ex post facto law.' 
Our state Supreme Court has recognized that the two constitutional provisions may not 
necessarily be of the same scope or subject to exactly the same interpretation. See Quinlan v. 
Idaho CommissionJor Pardons and Parole, 138 Idaho 726, 731, 69 P.3d 146, 151 (2003); State 
v. Lindquist, 99 Idaho 766, 769, 589 P.2d 101,104 (1979). 
However, our appellate courts have traditionally cited the two constitutional provisions 
together without "recognition of the possibility of a difference in scope or analysis." State v. 
Gragg, 143 Idaho 74,75, 137 P.3d 461,462 (Ct. App. 2005).7 As stated before, it is 
7 Citing Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 77, 90 P.3d at 302; State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 246-47, 796 P.2d 121, 123-24 
(1990); State v. Mee, 102 Idaho 474, 483, 632 P.2d 663, 672 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Slate v. 
Elisondo, 114 Idaho 412,757 P.2d 675 (1988); Statev. Byers, 102 Idaho 159,166,627 P.2d 788, 795 (1981); Wolf 
v. State, 99 Idaho 476, 480,583 P.2d lOll, 1015 (1978); State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 411-12, 973 P.2d 758, 
763-64 (Ct.App.1999); LaFon v. State, 119 Idaho 387, 389, 807 P.2d 66, 68 (Ct.App.1991); Mellinger v.Idaho 
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instrumental to note that the Idaho Supreme Court declared, "The Court of Appeals opinion in 
Gragg is thoughtful and its holding is correct." State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41,45,266 P.3d 
1146,1150(2011). 
1. Affirmative Disability or Restraint. 
Groves' claims an affirmative disability or restraint upon him as: "restrained from 
changing residences or employment" ... "compels post discharge conduct (mandating 
registration, re-registration, disclosure of public and private information, and updating of that 
information) under threat of prosecution" ... "the duties are significant and intrusive, because 
they compel offenders to contact law enforcement agencies and disclose information, some of 
which is otherwise private, most of it for public dissemination" ... "the time associated with 
SORA are intrusive," and that "SORA exposes registrants, through aggressive public notification 
of their crimes, to profound humiliation and community-wide ostracism." See generally, 
Appellant's Brief. 
Groves' claim is unpersuasive for three reasons. First, he fails to give recognition to 
IDAHO CODE § 18-8326, which was enacted to protect him from the harm he alleges. This statute 
balances the interests of the offender with that of the state. 
Secondly, in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84,123 S.Ct. 1140 (2003), the United States 
Supreme found the same argument Groves' is making to be unpersuasive: 
The Act imposes no physical restraint, and so does not resemble the punishment 
of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic affirmative disability or restraint. 
Department o/Corrections, 114 Idaho 494, 498, 757 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Ct.App.1988); State v. Scroggie, 110 Idaho 
103,113,714 P.2d 72, 82 (Ct.App.1986); Almada v. State, 108 Idaho 221, 224,697 P.2d 1235, 1238 
(Ct.App.1985)." 
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Hudson, 522 US., at 104, 118 S.Ct. 488. The Act's obligations are less harsh than 
the sanctions of occupational debarment, which we have held to be nonpunitive. 
See ibid. (forbidding further participation in the banking industry); De Veau v. 
Braisted, 363 U.S. 144,80 S.Ct. 1146,4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960) (forbidding work as 
a union official); Hawker v. New York, 170 US. 189, 18 S.Ct. 573,42 L.Ed. 1002 
(1898) (revocation of a medical license). The Act does not restrain activities sex 
offenders may pursue but leaves them free to change jobs or residences. 
The [9th Circuit] Court of Appeals sought to distinguish Hawker and cases which 
have followed it on the grounds that the disability at issue there was specific and 
"narrow," confined to particular professions, whereas "the procedures employed 
under the Alaska statute are likely to make [respondents] completely 
unemployable " because "employers will not want to risk loss of business when 
the public learns that they have hired sex offenders." 259 F.3d, at 988. This is 
conjecture. Landlords and employers could conduct background checks on the 
criminal records of prospective employees or tenants even with the Act not in 
force. The record in this case contains no evidence that the Act has led to 
substantial occupational or housing disadvantages for former sex offenders that 
would not have otherwise occurred through the use of routine background checks 
by employers and landlords. 
Although the public availability of the information may have a lasting and painful 
impact on the convicted sex offender, these consequences flow not from the Act's 
registration and dissemination provisions, but from the fact of conviction, already 
a matter of public record. The State makes the facts underlying the offenses and 
the resulting convictions accessible so members of the public can take the 
precautions they deem necessary before dealing with the registrant. 
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 100-101. 
Finally, IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8306 and 18-8307, provides when and where a person 
convicted of a certain type of sex offense must register. According to these statutes Groves is 
only required to appear in person before the county sheriff, of the county in which he resides, 
once per year (unless he was to move). IDAHO CODE § 18-8307( c). This slight imposition hardly 
compares to the burden of someone who may be facing a criminal restitution order for 
supporting five (5) minor children on a monthly basis, until each child turned 18 years of age. Cf 
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State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95 (Idaho 2007). 
This Court should not only follow the holding of Smith v. Doe in finding that Groves' 
claim of disability or restraint is without merit, but that his claim is even more meritless because 
the duty to register is nothing more than a slight imposition. And besides, there are 
consequences for those who engage in vigilantism against sex-offenders. 
Groves erroneously asserts, that the legislature created a new class of sex offenders by 
amending IDAHO CODE § 18-8303(1). See, Appellant's Brief, p. 6. Groves' pins his assertion on 
Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 827,203 P.3d 1221 (2009). Id. at 21. However, the state has not 
made a factual determination that Groves, as an individual sex offender, poses a high risk of 
committing an offense or will engage in predatory sexual conduct, as was the case of the violent 
sexual predator designation in Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 828, 203 P.3d 1221, 1227 (2009). 
Groves' duty to register as a sex offender is triggered simply and exclusively by reason of his 
conviction of the specified crime of Lewd Conduct With A Minor Under Sixteen, IDAHO CODE § 
18-1508, a crime that the Idaho legislature has designated as an aggravated offense. IDAHO 
CODE § 18-8303(1). 
The Idaho Supreme Court further cited with approval, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92, 
(2003) when the Court discussed whether or not if the burden of a life-time sex offender 
registration requirement was in violation of an offender's right to due process. The Court stated: 
The Ex Post Facto Clause does not preclude a State from making reasonable 
categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular 
regulatory consequences." Id. at 103,123 S.Ct. at 1153, 155 L.Ed.2d at 184. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has dismissed ex post facto claims "imposing regulatory 
burdens on individuals convicted of crimes without any corresponding risk 
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assessment." Jd. at 104, 123 S.Ct. at 1153, 155 L.Ed.2d at 184. Moreover, "[tJhe 
State's determination to legislate with respect to convicted sex offenders as a 
class, rather than require individual determination of their dangerousness, 
does not make the statute a punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause." 
Id. The fact that a sexual offender, convicted of a certain class of crime, may 
be required to register for life is not so punitive that it overrides SORA's 
regulatory purpose. This is particularly so because the Legislature need not 
make particularized findings in the regulatory context. 
State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 41, 45-46 (Idaho 2011 ). (emphasis added). 
2. Sanctions that have historically been considered punishment,' 
and 
3. Comparison to probation or supervised release. 
Groves concedes that "SORA does not expressly impose sanctions that have been 
historically been considered punishment" and that "courts addressing this issue have determined 
that there is no historical equivalent to these registration acts." 
Groves then argues in the alternative that, "dissemination provision at least resembles the 
punishment of shaming ... and "the registration and disclosure provisions 'are comparable to the 
conditions of supervised release or parole.' Groves cites to Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion in 
Smith v. Doe at 115 for support of his assertion. Appellant's Brief at 18. 
Notably, the United State Supreme Court rejected these arguments as well: 
Probation and supervised release entail a series of mandatory conditions and 
allow the supervising officer to seek the revocation of probation or release in case 
of infraction. See generally Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 120 S.Ct. 
1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 
3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). By contrast, offenders subject to the Alaska statute 
are free to move where they wish and to live and work as other citizens, with no 
supervision. Although registrants must inform the authorities after they change 
their facial features (such as growing a beard), borrow a car, or seek psychiatric 
treatment, they are not required to seek permission to do so. A sex offender who 
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fails to comply with the reporting requirement may be subjected to a criminal 
prosecution for that failure, but any prosecution is a proceeding separate from the 
individual's original offense. 
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 101-102. 
4. Traditional aims of punishment. 
Groves recognizes that the traditional aims of punishment are retribution and deterrence. 
Appellant's Brief at 15. He argues that "SORA determines who must register based not on a 
particularized determination of the risk the person poses to society but rather on the criminal 
statute the person was convicted of offending" and that the "unlimited public dissemination 
requirement provide a deterrent and retributive effect that goes beyond any non-punitive purpose 
and that essentially serves the traditional goals of punishment." ld. (emphasis in the original). 
Groves also notes that those who actually committed the same conduct and who plead to 
a lesser offense or whose convictions are overturned or who are acquitted do not have to register, 
despite having committed the same conduct. ld. at 15-16. He emphasizes that it is the judgment 
of guilt/criminal conviction that triggers the obligation to register as a sex offender, and 
therefore, this Court should conclude that SORA is punitive in its effect. ld. 
The United State Supreme Court unequivocally disposed of this argument as well: 
Any number of governmental programs might deter crime without imposing 
punishment. "To hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such 
sanctions 'criminal' ... would severely undermine the Government's ability to 
engage in effective regulation." Hudson, supra, at 105, 118 S.Ct. 488; see also 
Ursery, 518 U.S., at 292, 116 S.Ct. 2135; 89 Firearms, 465 U.S., at 364, 104 
S.Ct. 1099. 
The [Ninth Circuit] Court of Appeals was incorrect to conclude that the Act's 
registration obligations were retributive because "the length of the reporting 
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requirement appears to be measured by the extent of the wrongdoing, not by the 
extent of the risk posed." 259 F.3d, at 990. The Act, it is true, differentiates 
between individuals convicted of aggravated or mUltiple offenses and those 
convicted of a single nonaggravated offense. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.020(a)(1) 
(2000). The broad categories, however, and the corresponding length of the 
reporting requirement, are reasonably related to the danger of recidivism, and this 
is consistent with the regulatory objective. 
Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 102. 
The same reasoning applies to the Idaho legislature's determination of which sex offense 
convictions are reasonably related to the danger of recidivism and that it is the convictions of 
these felony crimes8 that warrant requiring the convicted offender to register. See, IDAHO CODE 
§ 18-8302. 
c. Groves Has Not Been Deprived of Any Rights. 
Groves maintains that his "primary focus, and allegation of unconstitutionality, rely 
primarily upon the fact that the State of Idaho has taken away rights from Petitioner that he 
previously had the benefit of' and that his "primary complaint for relief focuses upon the State of 
Idaho's action in taking away rights that had been previously granted.,,9 He argues that as of the 
time of his conviction and sentence: 
Idaho Code Sections 18-8310 and 18-8303 would have allowed Petitioner, after 
a period of ten (10) years from the date he was placed on probation, to petition 
the Court for a Show Cause hearing to determine whether he could be 
exempted from the duty to register as a sex offender" because his "victim was 
8 Groves asserts that sex offense convictions that require sex offender registration include misdemeanor sex 
offenses. This is a misstatement ofrule. Most, ifnot all sex offenses in Idaho are felonies per se. However, the 
SOR does not differentiate between the two criminal categories when a sex offender who has a foreign conviction is 
required to register in Idaho. See, IDAHO CODE § 18-8304 subparagraphs (b) and (c) and IDAPA Rules 11.1 0.03 et 
seq. 
9 ld., pp. 5, 6,10 and 23. 
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12 years of age at the time he committed the ojJense."IO (Appellant's emphasis 
added). 
Whether Groves has a right to due process protections, regarding his desire for an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether he is eligible for release from sex offender registration 
depends on whether his interest in being released from sex offender registration, is within the 
scope of the liberty or property language of U.S. Const. art. XIV. In other words, for Groves to 
assert a legitimate entitlement to due process with respect to some possibility that he be released 
from sex offender registration requirements, he must first establish an interest that triggers the 
requirement for due process. Ifhe cannot prove he has such an interest, it would be improper for 
the district court to grant Groves an evidentiary hearing. 
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed this issue in Maresh v. State, Dept. of Health and 
Welfare ex ref. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 970 P.2d 14 (1998): 
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "prohibits deprivation of 
life, liberty, or property without 'fundamental fairness' through governmental 
conduct that offends the community's sense of justice, decency and fair play." 
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,432-34, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-48,89 L.Ed.2d 
410(1986). 
*** 
To determine whether an individual's due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment have been violated, a court must engage in a two-step analysis. It 
must first decide whether the individual's threatened interest is a liberty or 
property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 
573, 575, 930 P.2d 603, 605 (1996) (citing Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 
2., 128 Idaho 714, 722, 918 P.2d 583, 591 (1996)); see also, True v. Dep't of 
Health and Welfare, 103 Idaho 151, 645 P .2d 891 (1982) (citing Goss v. Lopez, 
419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729; 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975)). Only after a court finds a 
10 Id, pp. 6 and 7. 
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liberty or property interest will it reach the next step of analysis, in which it 
determines what process is due. Schevers v. State, 129 Idaho 573, 575, 930 P.2d 
603,605. 
As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "[t]he requirements of procedural 
due process apply only to the deprivation of interest encompassed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Board of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564,569,92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). 
The United States Supreme Court has noted that property interests are "created '" 
by existing rules, .. , such as state law." ld. Likewise, this Court has indicated that 
"determination of whether a particular right or privilege is a property interest is a 
matter of state law" Ferguson v. Bd. of Trustees of Bonner Cty. Sch., 98 Idaho 
359, 564 P.2d 971, 975 (1977) (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 
2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976». Further, determining the existence of a liberty or 
property interest depends on the "construction of the relevant statutes," and the 
"nature of the interest at stake." True, 103 Idaho at 154, 645 P.2d 891 (citing 
Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 10-9, at 515-16 (1978)). Hence, whether a 
property interest exists can be determined only by an examination of the particular 
statute or ordinance in question. Bishop, 426 U.S. 341,96 S.Ct. 2074. 
*** 
A person must have more than an abstract need or desire for a benefit in order to 
have a property interest therein. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.Ct. 
2701. Further, that person must have more than a unilateral expectation in the 
benefit; instead, she must have a "legitimate claim of entitlement to it." ld. at 577, 
92 S.Ct. 2701. 
Maresh, 132 Idaho at 225-227, 970 P.2d at 18-20. 
"The Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the 
security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits." Maresch, 132 Idaho 
at 226, 970 P.2d at 19, citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 
L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). 
The language of IDAHO CODE § § 18-8307 and 18-8310 begin with the presumption that 
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sex offender registration is for life. Moreover, IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8303 and 18-8310 merely 
establishes a process by which an eligible sex offender may seek release from sex offender 
registration. They provide what Groves must show in terms of his evidentiary burden to justify 
such release. The statutes do not create a liberty or property interest that Groves alleges he had 
already acquired in specific benefits when he was convicted and sentenced. 
Rather, Groves had only the hope of being released. "That hope is not a property right 
and the frustration of such a hope does not trigger the right to a hearing." Maresch, 132 Idaho at 
226-227, 970 P.2d at 19-20, (citing Loebeck v. Idaho State Board of Education, 96 Idaho 459, 
461, 530 P .2d 1149, 1 151 (1975)( quoting Perrin v. Oregon State Board of Education, 15 
Or.App. 268, 515 P.2d 409 (1973)). 
Therefore, IDAHO CODE §§ 18-8303 and 18-8310 created no legitimate claim of 
entitlement for Groves or any other registered sex offender to petition for release from sex 
offender registration. Because there is no right created in the law, the district court acted properly 
by denying Groves an evidentiary hearing. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should uphold the district court's opinion in its 
Memorandum Decision re: Constitutionality of 2009 Amendment to IDAHO CODE § 18-8303(1), 
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and find that the challenged code section(s) are constitutional and that Groves was not entitled to 
an evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this __ if __ day of December 2013. 
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